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Uzbekistan is the seventh largest global cotton producer and third largest cotton 
supplier for world markets. Uzbekistan’s Government policies largely shield cotton 
producers from world market price signals, and cotton area has changed little over the 
past decade despite strong international price fluctuations. Government pricing and 
exchange rate policies tax cotton producers and more than offset the value of input 
subsidies for cotton growers. The degree of taxation declined for several years after 
2000, but increased again in the late 2000s. In the 2009, cotton output dropped as 
Uzbekistan responded to reduced water availability and increased global food prices 
with higher taxes on cotton growers. With continued taxation of cotton production, 
Uzbekistan likely will continue to lose ground to more dynamic cotton exporters like 
India and Brazil. As a result, USDA’s longrun baseline projections for Central Asia 
show that the region’s share of world cotton production will continue to fall over the 
next decade. 
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Introduction 
 
Uzbekistan is one of the world’s largest cotton exporters.1  Central Asia2 
accounts for 16 percent of world cotton trade, and Uzbekistan remains the 
leading producer and exporter among these former members of the Soviet 
Union. Uzbekistan accounted for 25 percent of world cotton trade in the 
1970s and 1980s, more than any other exporter. At that time, its per hectare 
cotton yield was consistently among the highest in the world, exceeding U.S. 
yields by 74 percent during the first half of the 1970s (fig. 1). 
 
Since then, Uzbekistan’s cotton yield has trended downward, and the Uzbek 
share of world trade has slipped below 10 percent (fig. 2). Elsewhere around 
the world, yields have increased, with annual gains among major exporting 
countries ranging between 1.6 percent (United States) and 4.3 percent 
(Brazil). Uzbekistan has successfully transitioned into an Asian supplier as 
its traditional markets in Russia and Ukraine have dwindled, but with output 
now about half of its 1985 level, it may not be meeting its full potential. 
 
It is questionable whether Uzbekistan could sustain a return to its mid-1980s 
production levels or whether it would want to. Soviet planners oversaw an 
enormous increase in Central Asia’s irrigated cotton area between 1945 and 
the 1980s. The consequent streamflow reductions and runoff contamination 
by fertilizers and other chemicals substantially reduced the area formerly 
covered by the Aral Sea, resulted in toxic residue along former coastal 
regions, and reduced crop yields in some provinces. In addition, wide- 
spread reports of child labor in Uzbekistan’s cotton harvest add yet another 
dimension to the evaluation of the country’s optimal cotton output levels 
(Environmental Justice Foundation, 2005).3 Recent weather problems and 
disputes with neighboring countries over irrigation supplies suggest that, 
even with a return to mechanization, Uzbekistan’s current maximum produc- 
tion potential may be lower than it once was. Regardless of Uzbekistan’s 
potential for sustainable production, a review of the country’s economic and 
agricultural policies shows significant government intervention that currently 
hinders cotton production, reducing output. 
 
 
Figure 1 
Uzbekistan’s cotton yields lag 
Kilograms per hectare 
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1All data on agricultural output, 
consumption, and trade came from 
USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service 
Production, Supply and Distribution 
(PS&D) database for global agricul- 
ture, unless specifically noted other- 
wise. Units of measurement follow 
USDA conventions for international 
data, which include stating cotton data 
in fiber terms rather than as seedcotton, 
even in reference to countries where 
farmers market the latter. 
 
2Central Asia refers to the former 
Soviet Republics of Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
and Uzbekistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3Since it gained independence, 
Uzbekistan has largely abandoned the 
formerly widespread use of mechanical 
harvesters (Pomfret, 2000), possibly 
as a result of the disruption of critical 
supply chains with the breakup of the 
Soviet Union. Financial distress on 
Uzbek cotton farms also may have 
reduced mechanization (Isengildina et 
al., 1998). The USDA attaché reports 
that wages for cotton picking are sub- 
stantially higher in Kazakhstan and the 
Kyrgyz Republic than in Uzbekistan 
(USDA/FAS, 2005). 
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Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and Distribution Online data, 
2012; USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, 1977. 
3  
This study estimates the degree of taxation implicit in the policies used by 
Uzbekistan to set the domestic producer price of cotton, and calculates the 
impact of these policies in terms of a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) 
(see box, “Nominal Rate of Assistance”). We combine information about 
Uzbekistan’s cotton sector from several recent studies, assess the net degree 
of direct and indirect taxation of cotton in Uzbekistan, and examine how this 
taxation has varied over time. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Uzbekistan cotton production and share of world trade, 1970-2012 
1,000 bales (production) 
10,000 
Percent (share of world trade) 
35 
 
 
8,000 
 
 
6,000 
 
 
4,000 
 
 
2,000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Share of world trade 
 
30 
 
25 
 
Production 20 
 
15 
 
10 
 
5 
 
0 0 
1970 75 80 85 90 95 2000 05 10 
Marketing year 
Source: USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, Production, Supply and Distribution Online data, 
2012; USDA, Foreign Agricultural Service, 1977. 
 
 
 
 
 
Nominal Rate of Assistance  
 
Measuring agricultural support for a particular commodity requires measuring 
direct subsidies provided to or taxes imposed upon producers, but also analysis 
of: 
 
• Relevant trade barriers; 
 
• Support to sectors providing inputs; and 
 
• Whether domestic consumption is subsidized or taxed. 
 
The presence of multiple exchange rates also must be accounted for in countries 
that enforce capital controls. Josling et al. (2010) summarized the various 
accounting conventions used to measure agricultural support programs. This 
study follows the approach described in Anderson et al. (2009) and calculated 
a nominal rate of assistance (NRA). We used data on the export parity of 
Uzbekistan’s procurement prices—differentiated by official and parallel 
exchange rates—to estimate the level of implicit and explicit producer taxation 
(see Appendix for details). 
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Uzbekistan’s “State Order”  System 
and Cotton 
 
Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Uzbekistan has 
followed a strategy of gradual transition from planned to market economy. 
The government continues to exercise extensive control in agriculture, partic- 
ularly in cotton and wheat production, which are referred to as “centralized” 
crops. The State maintains ownership of the land, and the right to use land for 
agriculture (other than household plots) is conditional on acceptance of the 
State’s quotas for planting cotton and wheat. The State also provides subsi- 
dized inputs, including irrigation. 
 
The “State order” system also includes quotas on the production of cotton and 
wheat, as well as on area planted. To ensure quotas are met, the State moni- 
tors efforts year-round (Veldwisch and Spoor, 2008): leaching4 is monitored 
in the winter; planting area, varieties, and dates are determined by the State 
in the spring; and fertilizer application during the growing season is directed 
by Ministry of Agriculture and Water Resources (MAWR) officials. During 
the cotton-growing season, State officials visit farms to determine yield 
potential and adjust planning targets and production quotas. Annual planting 
area is determined by a State plan and, at the local level, planning may 
extend to determining which fields are used for cotton, wheat, or noncentral- 
ized crops. While the State and collective farms organized during the Soviet 
period have been largely privatized since 2006, a large number of farms still 
rely on centralized Machine Tractor Parks (MTP) for machinery, and MTPs 
prioritize centralized crops.5 
 
The textile industry exemplifies Uzbekistan’s partial transition from planned 
to market economy. Uzbek cotton consumption has grown in recent years, 
representing greater foreign investment and an effort by the government 
to increase the share of fiber processed locally rather than exported. Many 
textile enterprises are joint ventures, with the government as the main share- 
holder (Rudenko, 2008). The Ministry of Textiles has been reorganized into 
the State Joint Stock Company (SJSC) UzbekEngilSanoat, which manages 
the government’s shares in textile firms and is also engaged in promoting the 
export and domestic sales of local textile output. SJSC UzbekEngilSanoat 
also promotes investment in the textile industry (Naumov et al., 2010). 
 
 
 
4Irrigation can result in soil sali- 
nization. Extra water, in addition to 
crop requirements, can be applied 
to irrigated fields to leach these salts 
away (Ayers and Westcot, 1994). In 
Uzbekistan, this commonly occurs 
during winter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5MTPs were formerly a component of 
the State’s authority over agricul- tural 
producers, but the relationship has 
evolved into what one study describes 
as a “patron-client” relationship dis- 
tinct from formal authority (Shtaltovna 
et al., 2011). 
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Uzbek Cotton Pricing 
 
The main policy instrument that transfers resources from cotton production 
is a procurement price set below world prices. Procurement below world 
prices is possible because producers are effectively required to sell their 
cotton exclusively through official channels. While much of Uzbekistan’s 
cotton is exported, international trade is strictly controlled. This restriction 
limits global price transmission and allows resources to be transferred from 
producers, either directly by the government or indirectly through semi- 
governmental firms. 
 
International cotton prices adjust relatively freely, so exporting countries 
seldom sustain significant gaps between their export prices and the world 
price. Uzbekistan regulates its export price, but does so in a relatively trans- 
parent manner. The Uzbek foreign trade companies (FTCs) authorized to 
export under the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, Investments, and 
Trade6 price cotton based on the A Index7 and Cotlook’s quote for Uzbek 
cotton. Exceptions occur in some years, but they are difficult to sustain. 
For example, Uzbekistan’s Government temporarily imposed a minimum 
export sales price of 60 cents per pound in December 2008, (Cotton Outlook, 
2009). World prices averaged well below that level for several months during 
2008/09, resulting in an unprecedented near-doubling of ending stocks, to 50 
percent of use. 
 
Policymakers in Uzbekistan have to take the world price of cotton as given 
when determining export prices, but the determinants of the State procure- 
ment price (SPP) are unclear. Djanibekov et al. (2010) suggested that the 
SPP is established annually based on the world price minus marketing 
costs. Guadagni et al. (2005) describe such a mechanism as well, but 
noted that costs were overstated. Sadler (2006) reported that prices were 
calculated based on production costs adjusted by recent inflation and 
asserted that, in earlier years, prices were fixed as a percentage of interna- 
tional prices, ranging from 70 percent in 1996 to 85 percent in 1997 and 
100 percent in 2000. Rudenko et al. (2009) describe a process where the 
semi-governmental State joint stock company that monopolizes ginning 
in Uzbekistan, UzPakhtaSanoat, negotiates a price with the FTCs. For our 
purposes, this last observation is perhaps the most useful, highlighting the 
fact that price is determined by balancing competing interests within the 
Uzbek Government. 
 
Volatile world prices hinder policymakers’ ability to precisely target the rela- 
tionship between the SPP and the world price; they have to choose between 
recent price movements and longer-term averages when forecasting the world 
price. One study (Sadler, 2006) noted that, at least prior to 2005, producers 
entered into a sales contract with their local gin, and that, theoretically, the 
price would be adjusted if the market price changed. In practice, the price 
was set so low that even a decline in the market price left it above the contract 
price. Thus, the system acted as a price smoothing mechanism, reducing SPP 
volatility compared with the world price (fig. 3). Rudenko et al. (2009) noted 
that unforeseen price changes between the time the prices are initially negoti- 
ated and the time cotton is finally exported are absorbed by the FTCs, effec- 
tively smoothing farm prices. Pomfret (2009) also characterized the State 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6Three FTCs account for virtually 
all of Uzbekistan’s cotton exports: 
Joint-Stock Company Uzinterimpex, 
State Joint Stock Foreign Trade 
Company Uzmarkazimpex, and 
Uzprommashimpeks. About 75-80 
percent of Uzbekistan’s cotton produc- 
tion is exported. Cotton for domestic 
mill use is purchased through the 
Uzbekistan Commodity Exchange, 
which also accounts for a portion of 
cotton exports. 
 
7The A Index is regarded as cotton’s 
world price. Published by Cotlook Ltd, 
the index is an average of the five lowest 
quotes for Middling 1 3/32’ upland 
cotton from among 19 types traded 
internationally. Prices represent offering 
quotes, for delivery at Far East ports. 
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procurement system as insulating farmers from world price movements. This 
characteristic is not necessarily intentional, but is definitely a consequence of 
policy in Uzbekistan. 
 
 
Figure 3 
World, United States, and Uzbekistan cotton prices 
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Sources: State procurement prices (SPP) from USDA’s attaché in Tashkent and the International 
Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC). U.S. cotton price from USDA, National Agricultural Statistics 
Service, 2011. World cotton price from Cotlook Ltd. Exchange rates from the United Nations 
Development Programme (2006) and TCX Investment Management Company B.V. 
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Exchange Rate Policy 
 
More than 75 percent of Uzbekistan’s cotton is exported, so foreign 
exchange rate policy is an important determinant of the NRA. Uzbekistan’s 
Government controls capital flows and its exchange rate, and cotton and 
gold are “centralized” exports. Centralization means that all foreign 
exchange earnings from these commodities must be surrendered to the 
government for conversion into local currency (the Soum) at the official 
exchange rate.8 At times, this policy mix has resulted in a significant 
implicit tax on the cotton sector as a result of the official exchange rate’s 
overvaluation. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) study of this policy 
during its peak years (Rosenberg and De Zeeuw, 2001) found that exchange 
rate overvalution transferred the equivalent of between 3.4 percent (1997) 
and 6.7 percent (1999) of gross domestic product (GDP) from the cotton 
sector to the government. 
 
The goals of exchange rate policy can include expansion of trade, control- 
ling inflation, and assistance in achieving longrun development goals. 
An undervalued exchange rate can promote exports, but an overvalued 
exchange rate reduces incentives to produce tradable goods. It can even be 
specifically employed as an export tax.9 However, an overvalued exchange 
rate reduces import prices in domestic currency terms, reducing local infla- 
tionary pressure. Foreign exchange shortages are likely to result, which 
can hinder imports but also provide a policy opportunity as sectors can be 
targeted for assistance through preferential access to the limited supply of 
foreign exchange. 
 
Uzbekistan’s overvaluation first became significant late in 1996 and has fluc- 
tuated widely since then. Financial sector reforms starting in 2000 and two 
large devaluations of the official exchange rate in May 2000 and November 
2001 helped bring the official and parallel market exchange rates into align- 
ment by 2003 (table 1). This culminated with Uzbekistan’s acceptance of the 
currency convertibility obligations of Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement in October 2003.10 During 2008, however, the official exchange 
rate again began to diverge from the parallel market rate.11 Since then, over- 
valuation ranged from 15 percent in 2008/09 to 48 percent in 2011/12. 
 
When considering the interaction between the level of the SPP and the degree 
of exchange rate overvaluation, note that cotton policy is probably not the 
primary determinant of the official exchange rate’s level or of its ratio to the 
parallel rate. Instead, policymakers presumably set the SPP with knowledge 
of the government’s goals with respect to the real exchange rate. While poli- 
cymakers’ targeting of the real exchange rate may not be perfect, the rate has 
followed relatively clear trends, so the export parity of the nominal SPP can 
also be targeted to a large extent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8Noncentralized exports have a 50 
percent surrender requirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9Brazil’s multiple exchange rate sys- 
tem during the 1930s is one example 
(Barros, 2009). At that time, coffee 
accounted for 70 percent of Brazil’s 
exports, and coffee export earnings 
were subject to repatriation at an 
exchange rate higher than that applied 
to many other commodity transactions. 
 
10However,  Pomfret (2009) and 
others found that access to foreign 
exchange in bank accounts is prob- 
lematic, and even access to cash in the 
form of domestic currency has been 
difficult (Gemayel and Grigorian, 
2005). In addition to the foreign 
exchange price, the government has 
administrative policies that can alter 
the value of foreign exchange holdings, 
examination of which is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
 
11The unofficial foreign exchange 
market in Uzbekistan is referred to 
here as the “parallel” market. Lindauer 
(1989) assigned the term “black” mar- 
kets to illegal parallel markets. Press 
reports from Uzbekistan suggest that 
parallel markets are currently illegal, 
but may have been legal previously. 
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Table 1 
Uzbek cotton procurement prices and exchange rates 
 
 
 
Parallel 
 
Marketing year 
Procurement 
(SPP) 
Exchange rate 
(official) 
Exchange rate 
(parallel) 
exchange rate 
market premium 
Soums per ton   —— Soums per U.S. dollar —— Percent 
 
1999/2000 34,800 168 684 308
2000/01 52,000 331 903 173
2001/02 80,000 635 1,355 113
2002/03 126,000 918 1,153 26
2003/04 195,000 992 999 1
2004/05 225,000 1,069 1,067 0
2005/06 255,000 1,185 1,175 -1
2006/07 306,000 1,244 1,268 2
2007/08 352,000 1,293 1,344 4
2008/09 430,000 1,403 1,610 15
2009/10 454,850 1,537 2,101 37
2010/11 587,980 1,661 2,360 42
  2011/12  496,020  1,850  2,730  48   
SPP=State procurement price. 
Sources: Procurement prices from USDA’s attaché in Tashkent and the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee (ICAC). Exchange rates from the United Nations Development Programme 
(2006) and TCX Investment Management Company B.V. 
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Calculating the  Export Parity 
of Domestic Prices 
 
Accurate information about Uzbekistan’s economy is limited, and official 
statistics are often unreliable.12 Determining how economic policy affects 
cotton production is also difficult to calculate due to the pervasiveness of 
government intervention. The full policy impact on producers is a function 
of numerous local administrative decisions and likely intentionally lacks 
transparency. Uzbekistan, however, is not completely closed off from the rest 
of the world. Procurement prices and exchange rates are available and can be 
used to examine the relationship between Uzbekistan’s SPP and world prices 
and to estimate whether procurement price policies result in an implicit tax 
(or subsidy) on cotton production. 
 
This approach is based on a comparison of the ratio of the SPP to world 
prices against the comparable ratio—prices received relative to world 
prices—for U.S. farmers. Uzbek farmers, like those in most low-income 
countries, market their output as unginned seedcotton, so the SPP is a seed- 
cotton price. In contrast, U.S. farmers gin their own cotton, market the fiber 
and seeds separately, and receive income from both products. U.S. and Uzbek 
prices must, therefore, be adjusted to make them more directly comparable. 
U.S. prices are adjusted by deducting the cost of ginning from the farm price 
for fiber and then adding in the value of the cottonseed sold separately. The 
Uzbek SPP for seedcotton is adjusted to a fiber-equivalent basis through divi- 
sion by the proportion of fiber typically derived from Uzbek seedcotton.13 
U.S. and Uzbek cotton are of similar quality, so differences in export parity 
may indicate whether pricing creates a tax or subsidy for Uzbek farmers. 
 
Pomfret (2009) estimated Uzbek ginning costs for 2002, and Rudenko et 
al. (2009) estimated the same costs for 2004. Both studies reported ginning 
costs at around 10 cents per pound, comparable with U.S. costs for 2002 
(USDA/ERS, 2012a). Estimated U.S. ginning costs for 1999-2010 are avail- 
able from ERS’s cost and returns estimates; NASS’s farm price for cotton- 
seed multiplied by the ratio of U.S. cottonseed to cotton fiber production 
provides an estimate of the additional value available to U.S. farmers from 
their farm output (USDA/NASS, 2012; USDA/FAS, 2012).14 We assumed 
that transportation costs to export markets were similar, and the distances to 
Tianjin (China) from both Bandar Abbas (Iran) and Long Beach, CA, suggest 
this assumption is plausible. Being landlocked—and entirely bounded by 
neighbors that are themselves landlocked—Uzbekistan faces export impedi- 
ments that do not affect U.S. exports, but evidence suggests that ocean freight 
charges are lower for Uzbekistan, which is possibly offsetting.15 
 
U.S. policy currently has little effect on the price U.S. cotton farmers receive 
relative to the world.16 Therefore, the export parity of U.S. farm prices to 
world prices should be representative of transportation costs and marketing 
margins freely determined by market forces. Data from USDA’s Farm Service 
Agency (FSA) support this conjecture. U.S. farm legislation mandates that 
FSA survey cotton exporters annually to measure average marketing costs of 
U.S. cotton to foreign markets. During 2004-09, these costs ranged between 
19 and 24 percent of the Cotlook A Index (USDA/FSA, 2012). During the 
same period, the export parity of U.S. farm prices averaged 74 percent, 
12According to IHS Global Insight 
(2011), “all economic data emanating 
from the country [are] highly suspect.” 
The IMF regularly notes weaknesses 
and inconsistencies in Uzbek data that 
hinder evaluation of economic perfor- 
mance (IMF, 2007). 
13Piggott and Wohlgenant (2002) 
described the relationship between 
the prices of processed goods jointly 
produced from an input and the input’s 
price. If the proportions of the joint 
products are α and 1-α; the price of 
seedcotton is A; the price of cotton seed 
is B; the cost of ginning is C, and the 
price of cotton fiber is P, then: P = [A – 
(1-α)B + C]/α. In Uzbekistan, average 
ginning outturn is 32 percent (α). Here 
we follow the widely accepted simplifi- 
cation of dividing the seedcotton price 
by the ginning outturn. This allows 
direct comparison with the adjusted 
U.S. price described in the text. 
 
14Uzbek farmers are reportedly 
permitted to purchase byproducts from 
their ginned cotton at a discount, and 
Velshwisch (2008) indicated that this 
occurs at least in Khorezm, but other 
authors suggest that the practice is 
not widespread. The discount would 
likely only add a few cents per pound 
to the procurement price, changing the 
calculations minimally. Rudenko (2008) 
noted that Uzbekistan’s crushing indus- 
try pays relatively little for the cotton- 
seed it procures and is highly profitable. 
15Verma (2008) found that transpor- 
tation from Bandar Abbas to China 
may be as much as 3 cents per pound 
less expensive than from the West 
Coast of the United States, or 4-5 per- 
cent of the world price. USDA’s attaché 
indicated that Uzbekistan’s supports 
an excellent transportation infrastruc- 
ture but, for our purposes, we simplify 
calculations by assuming that higher 
domestic costs offset Uzbekistan’s 
external transportation advantage. The 
need to transfer to a different gauge 
rail system at the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) -Iranian 
border is an example of a higher cost 
between farm and port. 
 
16User Marketing Certificates (more 
widely known as the “Step 2” program) 
were determined by a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) dispute panel to 
act partly as an export subsidy. The 
program was terminated after the 
2005/06 marketing year. The Food and 
Footnote 16 continued on page 10. 
10  
indicating an A Index premium of about 25 percent, consistent with FSA 
cost estimates (fig. 4). The reliability and speed of delivery of U.S. cotton 
should allow U.S. cotton to command a premium on world markets, but this 
premium is largely embodied in the farm prices of U.S. producers. 
 
While adjusted U.S. farm prices for cotton averaged about 25 percent below 
the world price during 1999/00-2010/11 (table 2), the Uzbek SPP averaged 
about 50 percent below the world price when valued at official exchange rates 
and averaged about 60 percent below at parallel market rates, suggesting that 
the official procurement price substantially underestimates the value of Uzbek 
cotton on world markets. Within this 12-year period, distinctly different sub- 
periods can be discerned, with implicit taxes reaching their lowest levels 
between 2005/06 and 2008/09. 
 
Between 2005/06 and 2008/09, the SPP averaged only 44 percent below the 
world price (at market exchange rates). Using the U.S. average discount from 
export parity of 25 percent as the free-market cost of transportation and 
marketing, the additional 19-percentage–point discount relative to the world 
price received by Uzbek farmers indicated the implicit and explicit taxes 
resulting from government-administered prices backed by border controls. 
Our estimated taxes for 2000/01-2004/05 and the tax changes over time are 
consistent with findings from earlier studies,17 but new data indicate that the 
lower taxes maintained during 2005-08 have recently increased. 
 
 
Table 2 
Uzbek procurement and U.S. farm and world cotton prices 
State procurement price (SPP) 
Footnote 16 continued from page 9 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute 
(FAPRI, 2005) estimated that the 
program added a 2.9 percent premium 
to the U.S. farm price relative to the 
world price. This is similar to the 
2.3-percentage-point relative decline 
observed in the U.S. price between 
2006/07 and 2009/10 compared with 
between 1999/00 and 2005/06. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17Rudenko et al. (2009) found that 
Uzbek farmers received 66 percent of 
the world price in 2004. Guadagni et 
al. (2005) cited a figure of 77 percent 
for 2004 and noted that implicit taxes 
as a result of price controls fell with the 
unification of exchange rates. Pomfret 
 
Marketing year 
Official 
exchange rate 
Parallel 
exchange rate U.S. farm price World price 
U.S. cents per pound 
(2009) cited an estimate for marketing 
year 2001 of 54 percent export parity, 
and presented data consistent with a 37 
percent parity using this methodology. 
1999/00 29.4 7.2 45.0 52.8 
2000/01 22.3 8.2 49.8 57.2 
2001/02 17.8 8.4 29.8 41.8 
2002/03 19.5 15.5 44.5 55.7 
2003/04 27.9 27.7 61.8 69.2 
2004/05 29.8 29.9 41.6 53.5 
2005/06 30.5 30.8 47.7 56.1 
2006/07 34.9 34.2 46.5 59.1 
2007/08 38.6 37.1 59.3 72.9 
2008/09 43.4 37.9 47.8 61.0 
2009/10 42.0 30.7 62.9 77.5 
2010/11 50.2 35.3 81.5 165.0 
  2011/12  38.0  25.8  90.5  103.5   
Note: Procurement prices for seed cotton converted to fiber-equivalents by dividing by 32 
percent ginning outturn ratio. 
Sources: Procurement prices from USDA’s attaché in Tashkent and the International Cotton 
Advisory Committee (ICAC). U.S. price from USDA, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
World price from the Cotlook A Index. Exchange rates from the United Nations Development 
Programme (2006) and TCX Investment Management Company B.V. 
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The  Role  of Marketing Costs 
 
Export parity differences could, under some circumstances, stem from 
unavoidable differences in marketing costs—such as those introduced by 
poor infrastructure investment (World Bank, 1999) —but this does not appear 
to be the case with Uzbekistan. In developing countries, high costs can be 
introduced by small-scale marketing systems with poor vertical coordina- 
tion and integration. Underinvestment in storage facilities can lead to large or 
potentially large post-harvest losses. Marketing in Uzbekistan happens on a 
large scale, with few intermediate steps in the marketing chain and significant 
vertical coordination. Uzbekistan’s relatively arid climate and the seasonality 
of its rainfall mean that precipitation during key points in processing and 
shipping is comparable with the U.S. Southwest, where USDA has permitted 
outdoor storage of cotton placed in the U.S. marketing loan program. 
Investment in terminal facilities within Uzbekistan—and in railways 
leading to export points—has been significant as Uzbekistan has adjusted to 
exporting outside the Commonwealth of Independent States (Cotlook, 2010). 
 
There are inefficiencies embedded in Uzbekistan’s marketing system, but they 
are largely a consequence of government-sanctioned or government-owned 
monopolies and oligopolies at various stages. Uzbekistan’s rigid adherence 
to export pricing based on widely published world prices provides a useful 
monitoring mechanism to avoid FTC under-invoicing and off-shore profit 
capture. Greater returns, however, might be possible with more flexible 
marketing (Butler, 2005). Similarly, while a greater number of competitors 
for transportation services for Uzbek exports might eventually lower costs, 
government policy limits market entry. Such inefficiencies are ultimately 
implicit taxes on the consumers of these services. 
 
 
Figure 4 
Export parity for U.S. and Uzbek cotton prices 
Local farm price as percent of world 
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Sources: State procurement prices (SPP) from USDA’s attaché in Tashkent and the World 
Bank.  U.S. farm price for cotton and cottonseed from USDA’s National Agricultural Statistics 
Service. U.S. ginning costs from USDA’s Economic Research Service cost and returns. U.S. 
cotton and cottonseed production data from USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service Production, 
Supply and Distribution Online. 
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Nominal Rates of Assistance, by Policy 
 
The discount from export parity provides an estimate of total implicit and 
explicit taxes—a negative NRA. This NRA can be disaggregated (table 3) 
into impacts resulting from SPP policy (NRASPP) and exchange rate policy 
(NRAE) (see Appendix for details). Both measures are negative in virtually 
every year, suggesting that both the SPP and the exchange rate policy reduce 
producer revenues. NRASPP is more stable in certain respects than NRAE 
but fluctuates consistent with the price-smoothing characteristic of the policy 
noted earlier. For example, when world prices fell precipitously in 2008, the 
NRASPP reached its lowest level of taxation, or 6 percent. Alternatively, when 
world prices reached record highs in 2010, the NRASPP reached one of its 
highest levels of taxation, or 52 percent. Taxation through NRASPP trended 
downward during the early 2000s, stabilizing around 25 percent during 
2004-07 before rising during 2010-12. NRAE remained at or close to zero 
during 2003-07 but rebounded afterward, reaching 16 percent in 2011. 
 
 
Table 3 
Implied nominal rates of assistance (NRA), by policy (NRASPP and NRAE) 
 
Marketing year 
State procurement price 
(NRASPP) 
Exchange rate overvaluation 
(NRAE) 
Percent 
 
1999/00 -26 -56
2000/01 -48 -33
2001/02 -43 -30
2002/03 -53 -10
2003/04 -46 0
2004/05 -26 0
2005/06 -28 1
2006/07 -21 -1
2007/08 -29 -3
2008/09 -5 -12
2009/10 -28 -19
2010/11 -52 -14
  2011/12  -51  -16   
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service calculations based on data from USDA’s attaché, 
Cotlook Ltd, United Nations Development Programme (2006), and TCX Investment Management 
Company B.V. 
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Subsidies: Extensive and Hard  To Measure 
 
Subsidies comprise the other side of the balance sheet in an accounting of the 
net impact of government policy on cotton, and input subsidies are report- 
edly extensive in Uzbekistan. Abdullaev et al. (2009) found that subsidies 
amounted to $400 million in 2004, or approximately 43 percent of the cotton 
crop’s value, but asserted that they were lower in later years. Pomfret (2009) 
lists subsidies to cotton producers during 2000-04 that were equivalent to 
2.1-8.1 percent of GDP (or $251-$830 million).18 Guadagni et al. (2005) cited 
extensive input subsidies ($290-$486 million) during 2000-04 for Uzbekistan 
cotton farmers that extended to fertilizers, pesticides, and machinery services. 
Rudenko et al. (2009) noted that farmers received credit at an annual interest 
rate of 3 percent, compared with 16 percent market rates. Gilham et al. (1995) 
noted that water was essentially free for farmers. Abdulleav et al. (2009) 
noted that Water Users Associations (WAU) were established for fee-based 
water distribution, but that farmers lacked the resources to pay for such 
services, rendering the payment scheme ineffective. 
 
Veldwisch and Spoor (2008) found that subsidized fertilizer was available to 
farmers, with the amount distributed determined by their planted area and 
expected yield. Farmers also were entitled to subsidized diesel, however, 
the fuel was stored at Machine Tractor Parks (MTP) and distributed only with 
MTP services. This study also noted that subsidized farm credit was directed 
into bank accounts similar to settlement accounts used during the Soviet Era. 
These same accounts were used to deposit payments for cotton deliveries, 
while input costs from State-owned firms were deducted directly. Input 
deliveries may have been partly diverted by officials for personal gain and, 
according to numerous reports, it is very difficult if not impossible for farmers 
to withdraw cash from these bank accounts. Rudenko et al. (2009) found that 
the difficulty accessing the accounts was perceived by farmers as a constraint 
on cotton production. 
 
Inconsistent subsidy estimates for Uzbek cotton partly reflect the reluctance of 
officials, traders, and farmers to share valuable information but also reflect the 
nature of Uzbekistan’s economy. Markets for credit and other inputs are poorly 
developed, and, for example, bartering is commonplace. The conditions placed 
on the use of subsidized inputs add difficulty to calculating the actual value of 
input subsidies. On the other hand, without complete markets, assigning a value 
to State-provided services remains difficult and raises the possibility that their 
actual value exceeds that assigned in the studies discussed here. When consid- 
ering the high degree of taxation found in numerous studies, it is important to 
fully appreciate the uncertainty of these calculations. 
 
Cotton producers do see some benefits from this centralized system. First, 
producers experience less inherent risk based on the price smoothing aspect 
of the SPP determination. Uzbek farmers were protected from shifts in rela- 
tive world prices during 2000-08 that resulted in a 36-percent decrease in 
U.S. cotton planted area, compared with a 9-percent decrease in Uzbekistan. 
Second, the system supports the maintenance and operation of the country’s 
irrigation system. Managing one of the world’s more complex irrigation 
systems is a not an insignificant task, and operation and maintenance issues 
in Uzbekistan may be less critical than in some neighboring countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18Calculation based on GDP data 
from IHS Global Insight. 
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Taxation Offsets Subsidies for Uzbek Cotton 
 
The data we analyzed only assessed the implicit taxation of cotton producers 
through prices. The comprehensive level of net taxation or subsidization 
depends on the impact of other policies as well. Earlier, comprehensive 
studies indicated that shifts in net aggregate support for cotton were highly 
correlated with pricing policy shifts. Shifts in net taxation also were corre- 
lated with shifts in Uzbekistan’s cotton yields. Recent world price volatility 
makes analysis of recent pricing policies more complicated but, combined 
with recent cotton yield data, the shift in the relationship between domestic 
and world cotton prices suggests that total net taxation increased after 2008. 
 
Guadagni et al. (2005) and Pomfret (2009) attempted to assess the overall 
taxation of Uzbek cotton. Guandagni et al. (2005) completed a detailed study 
that included input subsidies, exchange rates, the SPP, taxes, and debt restruc- 
turing. Debt restructuring was a significant share of government support 
in some years, which further complicated attempts to calculate support. They 
determined that, on a net basis, taxation of the cotton sector reached 5 percent 
of GDP in 2000 and trended downward to 1.8 percent in 2004. As a share of 
cotton farmers’ gross income, taxation trended from 50 to 20 percent over the 
same period. Pomfret (2009) reported that net transfers from cotton producers 
as a share of GDP fell from 12.3 percent in 2000 to between 2.1 
and 5.4 percent during 2000-04. 
 
Results were not entirely consistent across studies. Nevertheless, they show 
that Uzbekistan’s net taxation of cotton declined in 2000-05. Note that the 
estimated range of net taxation (20-50 percent) underestimates the total nega- 
tive impact on cotton production in two ways. First, the costs to Uzbek cotton 
farmers were not fully enumerated even in the studies detailed here. Research 
by Rudenko (2008) and Velshwisch (2008) found that farmers also face 
payment delays and skewed classing19 when marketing their crop. Second, 
while subsidies partly offset taxes, they do so by introducing an additional set 
of distortions. Therefore, resource misallocations can persist or can even be 
amplified. Abdullaev et al. (2009) provided concrete examples of this situa- 
tion with respect to water management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19“Classification,” for our purposes, 
describes the application of standard- 
ized procedures for measuring the 
physical attributes of cotton, analo- 
gous to grading for grains. Gilham 
(1995) noted that, for the early 1990s, 
“Uzbekistan ginneries generally 
produce a higher percentage of higher 
grades than the percentage of these 
grades that are procured,” and cited the 
failure to pay farmers a premium for 
higher quality as one of the reasons. 
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Linking Policies To Cotton Production 
 
Since 2008, increased observed implicit net taxation through prices has 
coincided with lower yields, similar in both respects to the years prior to 
2004. While producers’ efforts and actual yields could vary with producers’ 
expected returns, an additional factor bolsters the link between taxation and 
reported yields: implementation of the State order system during periods of 
high taxation likely skews yield estimates for Uzbekistan. 
 
Net taxation breaks the alignment of interests between cotton producers and 
the State. While the State observes producers’ efforts to meet quotas, ulti- 
mately the asymmetry of information favors producers. To some extent, the 
asymmetry of information is less with respect to planting activity than with 
respect to the effort expended to achieve optimal yields. This ensures that 
some cotton area will be planted that producers later effectively neglect. Data 
on planting also is likely to be inflated, and the degree of inflation will be 
correlated with net taxation. 
 
Pomfret (2000), USDA’s attaché to Uzbekistan (USDA/FAS, 2000), and 
others have noted occasionally significant smuggling of Uzbek cotton to 
neighboring countries. Uzbek authorities cannot observe, for example, 
every time farmers achieve above-average yields, creating opportunities 
for producers to smuggle cotton out of the country. Thus, while we cannot 
observe every aspect of net taxation, we can expect reported yields to vary 
inversely with the level of taxation. 
 
Uzbekistan’s post-independence cotton yields trended downward but 
increased during the years when higher export parity indicated reduced taxa- 
tion through pricing policy (fig. 5). Yields jumped to a higher plateau during 
2004-07, averaging 19 percent higher than the previous 4 years.20  20Yield variability in each period is 
low, so the difference is significant at 
the 1-percent level. 
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Figure 5 
Uzbek cotton yield and State procurement price (SPP) export parity 
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Sources: Yield data from USDA’s Foreign Agricultural Service Production, Supply and 
Distribution Online and ERS calculations (real SPP) based on data from USDA’s attaché in 
Tashkent and the International Cotton Advisory Committee; the United Nations Development 
Programme (2006); and TCX Investment Management Company B.V. 
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Other Influences on Yield 
 
Other issues may affect cotton yield, but policy differences appear to have 
accounted for the much of the difference between the two periods (1999- 
2003 and 2004-07). Gilham et al. (1995) ascribed the post-independence 
yield decline to the cumulative impact of limited crop rotation and reductions 
in chemical and mechanical inputs driven by foreign exchange constraints. 
The United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP, 2011) highlighted how 
rising salinity and reduced streamflow have affected yields in Uzbekistan’s 
downstream provinces. With Uzbek cotton completely irrigated, yield vari- 
ability is low but not completely eliminated. Significant problems with irriga- 
tion supplies in 2000 and 2008 likely accounted for below-average yields. In 
addition to reduced taxation, good weather in 2004 and 2005 helped sustain 
yields. In 2010, growing conditions were very favorable, but yields remained 
relatively low.21 Yields in 2010 were even lower than those in 2008, while 
water intake data from the Amu Darya River indicate more than ample water 
supplies for irrigation (Scientific Information Center, ICWC, 2012). 
 
Post-2008 data show a rebound in estimated taxation but volatility in world 
cotton markets must be considered when assessing this data. The price- 
smoothing aspect of Uzbek policy means that plunging world prices in 2008 
resulted in unprecedentedly low taxation levels through SPP (6 percent). 
Shortly thereafter, record-high 2010 world prices drove the estimated NRASPP 
to one of the highest taxation levels in this study (52 percent).22 Based on the 
recent shift in cotton yields and a rebound in implicit taxation through prices 
for almost every year since 2008, we concluded that net cotton taxation has 
rebounded. Given that yields are currently at their pre-2004 level, net taxation 
is likely also similar to its pre-2004 level, around 50 percent. 
 
Data issues add a degree of uncertainty to our calculations. Subsidy values 
are difficult to calculate, as are the costs of such administrative procedures 
as delayed payments to farmers. Our research substitutes analysis of avail- 
able aggregate information for a detailed accounting at each step along 
Uzbekistan’s supply chain. But even such an accounting would hold signifi- 
cant ambiguity, given the structure of Uzbekistan’s economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21On October 15, 2010, Cotton 
Outlook’s Uzbekistan correspondent 
stated that, “this season’s cotton pro- 
duction…has benefited from excellent 
growing conditions.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22Note, however, that the export 
parity of U.S. cotton shifted sig- 
nificantly that year. Unprecedented 
price volatility and levels character- 
ized world cotton markets in 2010. 
Farmers’ prices in both the United 
States and Uzbekistan were largely 
determined before the mid-season 
peaks that drove the average 2010 
world price to such an unprecedented 
level. U.S. farmers missed these peaks 
due to the timing of their market- 
ing, and Uzbek farmers missed these 
peaks due to the timing of SPP deter- 
mination and government policy. 
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Factors Driving Changes in Net  Taxation 
 
The variations in net taxation of cotton discussed here may be a result of policy 
shifts in three broader aspects of Uzbekistan’s economy: food security, inflation, 
and the distribution of economic rents. 
 
Negative rates of assistance for cotton production make grain production 
relatively more attractive to producers and may play a role in food security 
policy. Uzbekistan’s post-independence transition to hard-currency food 
grain imports was an important factor in the reduction of cotton area during 
the 1990s.23 The shift from managed food-grain shipments between repub- 
lics within the Soviet Union to international market exchange increased 
Uzbekistan’s risk in relying on grain imports. In the mid-1990s, when 
Uzbekistan began taxing cotton production significantly, its grain import 
dependency ratio was 80 percent. By 1999/00, it had fallen to 12 percent, 
where it remained through 2007/08 (USDA/FAS, 2012). The global trade 
policy environment during this period also supported a reduced emphasis on 
food self-sufficiency as a result of low price volatility and a strong legacy of 
increasingly liberal trade arrangements around the world. 
 
In 2008, these trends were disrupted. Irrigation problems throughout Central 
Asia sharply cut Uzbek grain production, and world grain prices soared 
sharply. Uzbekistan’s main source of imported wheat—neighboring 
Kazakhstan—briefly imposed an export ban. In response, Uzbekistan 
announced an area shift for the next season from cotton to grains. The 
summer of 2008 also marked the reemergence of a parallel market premium 
for U.S. dollars, reducing the cost of importing grain. 
 
Inflation and food security are closely linked in Uzbekistan, given food’s 
large share of consumer expenditures. The large expenditure share for food 
and lack of central bank independence makes controlling inflation diffi- 
cult with volatile food grain prices (Al-Eyd et al., 2012). Lacking efficient 
markets, there is greater reliance on administrative measures to limit price 
increases, prolonging the time needed for stabilization. In 2008, Uzbek poli- 
cymakers explicitly linked exchange rate policy to inflation reduction (IMF, 
2008) and, with world grain prices surging once again starting in 2010, this 
situation likely continued. 
 
Another likely concern for policymakers is the level and distribution of 
economic rents. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) characterize Uzbekistan as 
an economy with extractive economic institutions, and highlight cotton in this 
respect. IHS Global Insight observed that: 
 
“Despite a high level of privatization, the country’s economy remains tightly 
controlled by the top circle of leadership. Many, if not most, major private 
entities are held by members, friends, and family of the ruling elite.” 
 
Reduced cotton production has implications for government revenues through 
excise taxes and to the beneficiaries of government-protected monopolies 
along the marketing chain. In the 1990s, when Uzbekistan’s net cotton taxa- 
tion rose sharply, cotton accounted for 40-60 percent of export earnings. By 
2001, this share had fallen to 25 percent and fell to 11 percent by 2010 as gold 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23Uzbekistan’s cotton area fell 29 
percent between 1987 and 1995. Cotton 
area subsequently never exceeded its 
1995 level by more than 1.5 percent but 
trended downward 5-8 percent in 2000 
and 2009. 
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and natural gas grew in importance.24 Increased taxation of cotton produc- 
tion, however, may sustain revenues provided by cotton, even as food security 
concerns reduce the volume of cotton output and associated rents. 
 
Uzbekistan is often characterized as pursuing import-substitution industri- 
alization (ISI). Under ISI, natural resource-based export sectors are taxed 
to finance investment in industry. Uzbekistan has had some success with 
ISI, raising textile output, boosting investment in energy production, and 
exporting cars. Policymakers may have decided to divert additional resources 
to industrialization after 2008 but evidence for such a shift appears slim. 
 
Looking forward, two factors likely will determine if Uzbekistan’s underlying 
policy environment continues to support a cotton policy that includes higher 
taxes on cotton producers: 
 
• Water-related constraints on agricultural production, and 
 
• Continued high world grain prices. 
 
The balance between water availability and needs remains key to both 
the intensity of Uzbekistan’s concern with food security and to local grain 
production costs. Regional surface temperatures have been trending up, 
while precipitation has been trending down in the catchment regions of 
Uzbekistan’s irrigation system (UNEP, 2011). These environmental develop- 
ments, combined with a growing reliance of upstream countries on winter 
hydroelectric output, have placed greater pressure on summer streamflows 
(Rakhmatullaev, 2010). As a result, Uzbekistan’s food security concerns will 
remain in the forefront and local grain production costs may also face pres- 
sure, suggesting that continued higher levels of cotton taxation could remain 
to improve the relative attractiveness of grain production. 
 
Trends in world food prices may ease inflationary pressures over time. 
USDA’s baseline forecasts include a reduction in real food grain prices 
between 2010 and 2020 (USDA/ERS, 2012b). While relatively small, this 
decline marks a shift from the large increases of 2005-11. Although prices 
are not expected to return to the record lows seen before 2006, they will help 
drive consumer prices down. Reduced inflationary pressure could induce 
Uzbekistan to reduce its exchange rate overvaluation and help moderate the 
impact of food security concerns on cotton taxation. 
 
24Other energy and oil products 
accounted for 25 percent; and other 
major products included food (10 
percent), metals (7 percent), machinery 
(6 percent), and chemicals (5 percent) 
(State Committee of the Republic of 
Uzbekistan on Statistics, 2011). 
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Conclusions 
 
Uzbekistan is a landlocked, relatively low-income, and significantly rural 
nation that inherited a complex economic legacy from decades as a member 
of the former Soviet Union. Its economic institutions emphasize centralized 
control of the economy and the appropriation of rents from natural resources 
for industrialization and for the benefit of the governing elite. Relations 
with neighboring countries—all former members of the Soviet Union—are 
complex partly because of shared resources, such as the Amu Darya and Syr 
Darya rivers. These circumstances are not expected to change in the imme- 
diate future, and Uzbekistan’s cotton sector likely will grow slowly under a 
relatively high tax burden. 
 
Shifts in Uzbekistan’s cotton policy have exacerbated shifts in world cotton 
markets since 2000. In the middle of the last decade—when world cotton 
prices reached record lows relative to other commodities—Uzbekistan 
reduced the economic burden on its cotton producers, resulting in higher 
yields, output, and exports and driving world cotton prices even lower. Then, 
as world cotton markets tightened and prices rose to new peaks, Uzbekistan 
cut cotton output and exports, partly through increased taxation, adding 
upward pressure on world prices. 
 
USDA’s longrun baseline estimates for Central Asia indicate that cotton 
production and exports likely will increase slowly over the next 10 years, and 
the region’s share of world output is expected to decrease. The slow pace of 
economic reform in Uzbekistan, which accounts for two-thirds of Central 
Asia’s cotton output, will remain a key factor driving the modest outlook for 
cotton in the region. The high level of net taxation illustrated here suggests 
that significant output gains could be achieved under alternative policies. 
However, sustaining such gains may require further reforms and investments 
resulting in more efficient use of inputs, particularly water. 
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Appendix: Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) 
 
The discount from the export parity calculated here can be disaggregated into 
separate impacts resulting from the State procurement price policy (NRASPP) 
and the exchange rate policy (NRAE) using tools found in the agricultural 
economics literature. Given that cotton exports are under a complete foreign 
exchange surrender requirement and that control of domestic and interna- 
tional trade means that domestic consumption of cotton fiber is based on 
world price (less a 15 percent discount, which essentially accounts for trans- 
portation according to Naumov, et al.), the approach used by Anderson et al. 
(2009) can be decomposed to illustrate the relative impact of the two policy 
instruments. The divergence of the State procurement price (SPP) from the 
world price can be analyzed as an export tax, and the divergence of official 
exchange rates (EO) from parallel rates (EP) can be treated as a separate addi- 
tional tax. We define P * as the A Index in U.S. currency terms (P ) multi- W W 
plied by 0.75 (i.e., 1-0.25, to adjust to a farm-equivalent), then: 
 
E  × P* (1 − t ) − E × P* NRA =     P  W  x  P  W   . SPP * 
P   W 
 
and,  
 
SPP t x  = 1 − * . PW  × EO 
 
1Note that the exchange rate in the 
parallel market, EP, is not the long- 
Following Anderson et al. (2009), when exchange rates are overvalued, the 
price of exportables is reduced by the fraction ex. Since cotton is a “central- 
ized” commodity with a 100 percent foreign exchange surrender requirement 
for exporters, 
 
 
e  = O  .1 x E 
term equilibrium rate. The macro- 
economic policies associated with the 
overvaluation of the exchange rate 
directly and indirectly drive the paral- 
lel market rate below the long-term 
rate, but it is the equilibrium rate in 
the context of those policies (Ghei and 
Kamin, 1999). 
P 
 
Thus, the total border support nominal rate of assistance is, 
 
e   × E × P * (1 − t ) − E × P * NRA =    X  P  W  x  P  W   , and, * 
P   W 
 
 
NRAE = NRA − NRASPP . 
 
A complete accounting of assistance also would require data on subsidies. 
While subsidies for inputs have been significant in some accounting efforts, 
input market distortions call these measures into question. The cost of late 
payments and skewed cotton classing also factor into farmers’ costs, offset- 
ting some of a given year’s input subsidies. 
 
As noted previously, earlier studies with access to subsidy estimates from the 
same period found that taxes on cotton exceeded subsidies, resulting in a net 
taxation of cotton producers ranging from 20 to 50 percent. The appendix figure 
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P
P
P
P
illustrates the relationships between world prices (PW), the efficient farm equiva- 
lent of world prices ( * ), the SPP, and total taxes and net taxes. 
W 
 
 
The measure of total implicit and explicit taxes, or the NRA, is 
SPP − * 
E W  .   P   
* 
W 
 
NRASPP can be translated into the terms used in the appendix figure and 
 
SPP − P * 
simplified to   E W   .   O   
* 
W 
 
 
Appendix figure 
Price-based estimate of total and net taxation 
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